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W
hy are some species’ brains
so large despite the meta-
bolic and developmental
costs? Why would two spe-
cies with the same body size have two
different brain sizes? These have been
central questions in the field of brain
evolution for decades and are the driv-
ing questions behind the article by Sol
et al. (1) in this issue of PNAS. Correla-
tions among various measures of brain
size, cognitive capacity, problem solving,
and behavioral ecology have been re-
corded in many groups of animals. The
conventional approach has been to in-
terpret these correlations as proxies for
‘‘as-yet-unknown’’ causal relationships
while relying on the assumption that
large brains confer greater cognitive
abilities. Such studies in recent years
have benefited from enhanced method-
ological capacities to measure brain size
(e.g., computed tomography), collect
large behavioral databases, and apply
powerful statistical tests to such data.
Collectively, this body of work has
brought to light some broad consistent
patterns of association among brain
size, cognition, and ecology across ani-
mal groups that can be summarized as
follows.
Various measures of brain size (e.g.,
encephalization quotient, brain–body
residuals, neocortex ratio) are positively
correlated with
Y feeding innovation, learning, and tool
use in birds and primates (2–10);
Y behavioral repertoire size in mammals
(11);
Y social complexity in birds, primates,
carnivores, and some insectivores (8,
12–16);
Y dietary complexity in primates (17–20);
and
Y unpredictability of the environment in
hominids (21, 22).
Universal Principles
The significance of these findings is that,
collectively, they suggest that there are
some ‘‘universals’’ across animal groups
in terms of which ecologies support, and
perhaps encourage, large brains. Fur-
thermore, these findings are consistent
with a general ‘‘behavioral f lexibility’’
hypothesis that says that large brains
confer an advantage when responding to
variable, unpredictable, and novel eco-
logical demands through enhanced
behavioral f lexibility, learning, and in-
novation. According to this hypothesis,
brains have evolved to respond to envi-
ronmental changes. Previous studies
have shown that there is a correlation
between brain size and environmental
complexity (see examples above). Stud-
ies have also shown that measures of
behavioral complexity or flexibility are
positively correlated with success in re-
sponding to the environment (23, 24).
However, up to now, we have not
known whether these statistical associa-
tions represent a meaningful set of
causal connections among these vari-
ables. A strong test of this hypothesis
demands a demonstration that cognitive
abilities mediate the connection between
brain size and a species’ ability to re-
spond to environmental complexity. The
work of Sol et al. (1) provides the stron-
gest evidence to date that these causal
pathways exist. The authors demonstrate
that powerful tests of hypotheses can be
performed by using archived data that is
quantifiable and ecologically relevant.
The report by Sol et al. significantly ad-
vances our understanding of brain, be-
havior, and environment by providing
empirical findings that bridge the gap
between statistical associations and cau-
sation, thereby approaching the goal of
being able to draw conclusions about
the actual fitness outcomes of various
hypotheses. This ability is, after all, the
‘‘bottom line’’ objective in these kinds
of studies.
Sol et al. (1) were able to conduct a
powerful study of brain size, innovation
rate, and survival rate for several rea-
sons. They were able to draw on a vast
literature on introduction data, innova-
tion reports, and brain size in birds.
They controlled for several potentially
confounding variables such as research
effort. Also, they used residuals of a
log-log least-squares regression of brain
versus body mass to account for the al-
lometric effects of body size on brain
size. In addition, the authors used path
analysis to reveal the causal relation-
ships among brain size, innovation rate,
and invasion potential. This method al-
lows for the testing of specific models
that correspond to specific predictions
about the causal connections among fac-
tors. Using a path analysis method, Sol
et al. were able to interpret their find-
ings in a causal, not simply correlational,
context.
There are a number of compelling
questions about brains, cognition, and
ecology that are raised by Sol et al.’s (1)
findings. Sol et al. found that birds with
large brains and greater cognitive com-
plexity (as measured by innovation rate)
are better able to cope with novel envi-
ronments (i.e., introduction into a new
location). These findings are consistent
with the general literature showing a
positive relationship between large
brains and environmental complexity
and novelty. But what exactly is it about
changing environments that requires
cognitive complexity? Various hypothe-
ses, e.g., extractive foraging (19, 25),
social intelligence (26–28), and resource
mapping (20) have focused on different
aspects of complexity and change. But
perhaps specific environmental domains
per se are not critical in this matter. In
the case of coping with a new location,
as in Sol et al.’s study, there will be a
myriad of aspects of the new environ-
ment that will be novel. Moreover,
changes in one domain (for instance,
resource distribution) often lead to ad-
justments in other (for instance, forag-
ing group size) domains. It may be that,
given the wide range of both social and
technical environmental demands associ-
ated with large brains, a higher-order
nonspecific ecological characteristic,
such as unpredictability, is all that is
necessary for large brains to be selected
and maintained.
Cognitive Complexity
What do the findings of Sol et al. (1)
and the previous literature imply about
the nature of cognitive complexity?
Does it involve specific factors? If so,
are some factors correlated and others
uncorrelated? If not specific factors, do
these findings better support the con-
cept of ‘‘g,’’ or general intelligence? Sev-
See companion article on page 5460.
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are better able to
cope with novel
environments.
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eral measures of cognitive complexity
(e.g., tool making and use, number of
social interactions) correlate positively
with innovation rate in both birds and
primates (6). This finding suggests that
cognitive complexity is a general prob-
lem-solving ability or, less likely in my
view, involves correlated evolution
across various cognitive domains. The
kinds of cognitive capacities that tie to-
gether in the literature we are discussing
are those that involve behavioral f lexi-
bility and adaptive problem solving
rather than highly specialized domains
of memory or calculation such as seed
caching (29, 30). Furthermore, the neu-
roanatomy is revealing. The parts of the
brain in birds and primates that are
correlated with complex ecologies and
innovative behaviors serve similar high-
level integrative and executive functions
in both groups. In birds these structures
are the nidopallium and the mesopal-
lium (31). In primates the relevant area
is the neocortex (especially the frontal
lobes). In both birds and primates these
areas of the brain are the ‘‘on-line’’
executive processing regions allowing
for opportunistic solutions to new
problems. It makes sense, then, that an
environment doling out uncertainty
would encourage the enhancement of
the very part of the brain that copes
with uncertainty.
Finally, what factors determine
whether a group of animals will main-
tain ecological stability by tracking the
environment through migration, etc.,
and which will adapt by evolving mecha-
nisms of cognitive and behavioral f lexi-
bility? Lefebvre and colleagues (6)
suggest that less innovative birds might
avoid environmental change by moving
back and forth with the seasons. Larger-
brained species might avoid moving and
instead cope with environmental insta-
bility through innovation. This idea is
reasonable. Perhaps one general pattern
is that if environmental changes tend to
be regular within an individual’s life-
time, e.g., seasonal, then species might
be able to develop specific mechanisms
for coping with those regular changes.
However, if environmental changes tend
to be unpredictable then a more general
f lexible cognitive strategy is required to
survive.
To reiterate, Sol et al. (1) take us a
step closer to causal explanations for the
general patterns of relationship among
brain size, cognition, and ecology across
so many animal groups. Their approach
offers us the potential to compare a
wide range of different animal groups.
So far, only birds and primates have
been dealt with in this manner with any
degree of depth. But there are other
taxa, cetaceans, carnivores, perhaps even
invertebrates, that are intriguing and
critical comparison groups for gaining a
handle on whether there are truly ‘‘uni-
versal’’ patterns of causation across
brain, behavior, and ecology on Earth.
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